Newsweek34%
Trump’s Nuclear Doctrine: Anything Is Possible For A Price 48%
By David Averre48%
7/23/2026, 3:05:29 PM
BS Summary: This article contains 12 faulty reasoning types, including Framing Effect, Negativity Bias, and Pessimism Bias, with Slippery Slope as the most egregious example at 17.6% saturation with 195 hits. Analysis detected 1,095 faulty-reasoning hits from 1,108 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 49.4% and a BS Rank of 48% (11,037 of 21,176 articles). This article is better (less manipulative) than 52.10% of the article peer group.
The United States’ new nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, struck yesterday as American missiles continue to batter Iran, was met with cries of hypocrisy!
and warnings it would spur on the race for a nuclear bomb in the Middle East.
This is neither surprising nor unfair, but the criticism fails to address a deeper, and perhaps more consequential, problem.
The agreement—which could purportedly grant Riyadh a path to build its own uranium enrichment facilities as part of its civilian nuclear program without undergoing stringent inspections by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the IAEA—signals we are entering a new era of nuclear doctrine.
Nuclear nonproliferation is no longer being treated as a universal standard.
Donald Trump likes to make deals, and the White House is telling the world that anyone can pursue their nuclear ambitions—provided you have enough bargaining power.
What may follow is a future in which states with enough money and geopolitical leverage can shop around for special nuclear deals from Washington—or Beijing or Moscow—while international safeguards become something to negotiate around rather than rules to meet.
Out With the Old Logic
The full text of the U.S.-Saudi agreement is yet to be made public, and any safeguards contained within remain unclear.
Trump claimed in a Truth Social post on Thursday: "There will be no enrichment of material!"
But several reports suggest Riyadh could process spent atomic fuel and build its own uranium enrichment facilities, pending a joint study to assess feasibility.
Not only do these capabilities present a pathway to producing nuclear weapons, but the Saudis may also be granted leave to operate their nuclear program without signing the "additional protocol"—an extra layer of protection that gives IAEA inspectors special monitoring powers to ensure everything is done by the book.
The logic that giving a country the freedom to enrich uranium, reprocess its fuel and operate free of strict international inspections could increase the risk of weaponization is exactly the premise that governed Washington’s other major civilian nuclear agreement in the Middle East.
In 2009, the U.S. and the U.A.E. signed a deal enabling Washington to transfer nuclear technology to the Emiratis for civilian use.
In exchange for America’s help in kick-starting a nuclear energy program, Abu Dhabi agreed it would not pursue enrichment or reprocessing capabilities and would comply with the IAEA’s additional protocol inspections, thereby guaranteeing it could not build a nuclear weapon.
The Saudi agreement seems to point in the opposite direction.
Now, at a time when the U.S. military is waging war on Iran to demolish its nuclear program, the White House appears willing to throw out its own nonproliferation principles to give special treatment to an economically valuable ally.
Darya Dolzikova, a Senior Research Fellow for Proliferation and Nuclear Policy at the RUSI think tank, told Newsweek: "It’s not surprising that the U.S. treats its allies a little differently from adversaries, even when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation.
"But once a country gets the expertise and technology to process fuel and enrich uranium, that knowledge doesn’t go away.
Relationships change—Iran first got its nuclear technology from the United States, but the political winds shifted and now those countries are at war.
A New Buyers’ Market?
Riyadh is not the first partner to negotiate a bespoke nuclear deal with Washington outside of international safeguards.
India signed a deal in 2008 to receive additional U.S. support for its civilian nuclear program while retaining its own enrichment capabilities.
But New Delhi already had its own robust civilian and military nuclear program, and is not a signatory of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty that aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology.
Saudi Arabia is different.
It is entering the nuclear club for the first time, and its de facto leader Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has openly declared Riyadh would pursue a nuclear weapon, should Iran manage to obtain one.
Even Russia, whose state nuclear company Rosatom has long wielded its nuclear technology as a tool of political and economic soft power, generally retains total control over the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel provided to its customers throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East.
By striking a special deal with Riyadh, Washington could effectively launch a new, global nuclear marketplace, where any sufficiently wealthy state that wants an atomic program of its own can play nuclear providers like the U.S., Russia and China off against one another to extract favorable, tailor-made deals.
A scenario where competing nuclear powers are incentivized to offer less restrictive and advantageous provisions of their atomic technology to secure commercial and diplomatic wins over their rivals is a recipe for disaster.
"We must be cautious, given that the full text of the U.S.-Saudi nuclear deal is not yet public," Dolzikova told Newsweek.
"But this deal raises the prospect of a new paradigm where states simply negotiate bespoke nuclear agreements and set their own provisions.
"We already have a great international system with the NPT and IAEA safeguards to regulate and safeguard the spread of nuclear technology.
We should stick to it."
Nothing Set in Stone
The ink from the pens of Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Abdulaziz bin Salman has barely dried, and details of the U.S.-Saudi agreement remain obscure.
Once it does go public, Congress will have some 90 days to scrutinize, challenge and pull apart all aspects of the deal before it goes into force.
There is no guarantee yet that Riyadh can set about building its spinning centrifuges, and if Trump is to be believed, they never will.
There are also plenty of legitimate reasons for the U.S. to pursue this deal.
Beyond curbing Russian and Chinese influence over a valuable partner in a volatile region, American companies will reap significant economic benefits.
Nuclear technology is notoriously complex, and original manufacturers remain heavily involved in the life cycle of the reactors and other tools they provide to customers.
It could provide long-term economic benefits for American companies, serve as a foundation for stronger diplomatic ties and further commercial deals with a key Middle Eastern partner, and give Washington more influence in the wider region.
However, this diplomatic and economic victory will quickly sour if it ushers in a new norm that pits Washington against its rivals as just one of several nuclear vendors.
The greatest risk is not that Saudi’s newfound nuclear capabilities trigger a renewed dash for a bomb in the Middle East.
It’s the creation of a world where nuclear safeguards become another relic of the Cold War: honored in speeches but waived in negotiations, just another price point in great-power deals.
Analysis
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