Foreign Policy23%
How the United States and Iran Can Solve Hormuz 39%
By Ellie Geranmayeh43%
7/15/2026, 10:48:10 AM
BS Summary: This article contains 33 faulty reasoning types, including Post Hoc (False Cause), Negativity Bias, and Indoctrination, with Biased Writer Voice as the most egregious example at 17.8% saturation with 199 hits. Analysis detected 2,197 faulty-reasoning hits from 1,120 analyzed words, generating a BS Score of 44.6% and a BS Rank of 39% (9,719 of 15,885 articles). This article is better (less manipulative) than 61.20% of the article peer group.
The United States and Iran are back in war mode over the flow of ships through the Strait of Hormuz.
Fundamentally, however, the two sides have the same strategic end goal: to reopen the strait in both directions.
Their dispute is over how much control each side will wield in the postwar management of this global shipping choke point.
The gaps are bridgeable, and it would be highly reckless for the United States and Iran to continue their bombing.
The wars of the past year have already demonstrated to both sides that military options are limited.
As they jockey to strengthen their hand over the Strait of Hormuz, they risk a larger war that might include Israeli strikes on critical Iranian infrastructure and Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, effectively closing another major shipping route.
For the Iranian regime, the strait has become a symbol of triumph over the United States and Israel and a guarantee of its survival.
Its ability to cut off access to the strait has proved to be a weapon of mass disruption to the global economy—and arguably its strongest deterrent against future attacks.
Any U.S. president will need to think twice before pursuing a regime-change war against Iran.
The more U.S.
President Donald Trump has doubled down on maximum pressure against Iran, the more Tehran has hardened its position over the strait.
In the early days of the April cease-fire, Iran declared the strait “completely open” to all commercial shipping through a “coordinated route,” signaling it would lift the de facto tolls imposed during the war and ease passage.
But the same day, Trump asserted the United States would continue its naval blockade, prompting a backlash from Iran’s military, which viewed this as a cease-fire violation.
Iran reversed course, temporarily closed the strait, and established a new “Persian Gulf Strait Authority” in May to more formally manage commercial transit.
A similar tug-of-war followed the recent memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two countries.
Iran interpreted article 5 as providing it with the right to oversee navigation in the strait during the 60-day truce period.
By contrast, the United States expanded support for ships using a southern route through Omani territorial waters, already employed discreetly during the shaky cease-fire period to bypass Iranian waters.
But Tehran realized that Washington was establishing this route as the new normal, reducing Iranian control over the strait, its leverage in negotiations, and its future deterrence.
Iran responded by firing at vessels using the Omani route.
In doing so, Iran was willing to run the risk of collapsing the MOU.
As one Iranian commentator close to the negotiating team recently explained on state television, “Either we hold on to this strait, or we go and become martyrs for it one by one.”
Indeed, this triggered the biggest U.S. bombardment inside Iran in months, prompting Trump to declare the end of the cease-fire.
While maintaining control over the strait is now a red line for Tehran, it has already shown openness to negotiating with Oman over the degree of that control.
Ultimately, Iran understands a compromise is necessary.
Unless shipping returns to normal, Iran itself will remain constrained by the U.S. naval blockade that Trump has reimposed.
China, which purchases close to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports, also depends on the strait reopening and has not endorsed Iran’s approach to controlling the passageway.
Beijing is therefore likely to be the most influential party in nudging Tehran toward a middle way.
Moreover, the longer Iran disrupts the strait, the more it diminishes its future value as other countries diversify away from it.
These factors open space for compromise.
Mediation efforts should first focus on establishing a temporary transit arrangement for the next four to six weeks until a permanent, regionally backed solution can be found.
One option would be a new joint Omani-Iranian control center (with a U.S. green light) providing security clearance for equal numbers of ships to use the strait’s northern and southern routes without fees, as envisaged under the MOU.
Another key step would be a public U.S.-Iran agreement to de-conflict in the strait, including pausing military vessel transits that might quickly trigger renewed fighting.
During this confidence-building period, the United States and Iran should agree on a system for mine clearance in the original traffic separation scheme adopted by the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1968.
Before the war, this scheme was the preferred route because of its safety and depth.
However, ships have avoided it since Iran declared it unsafe, amid concerns that the area was mined by Iran.
Iran rejected demining by the European-led maritime mission, despite its advanced capabilities already positioned for quick deployment to the strait.
Tehran is unlikely to hand over such a sensitive task to NATO militaries.
Instead, it may accept support from states it considers neutral or friendly, including Japan, which has advanced mine-sweeping capabilities.
A third party—trusted by the global shipping sector—would need to guarantee the strait is mine-free before shipping resumes.
In the long run, a regional service fee structure—which benefits Iran and reflects its role—may be inevitable.
Trump has legitimized this concept by announcing an extortionate 20 percent price tag for ships wanting to transit through Hormuz.
While he quickly backtracked after a push by U.S. partners in the Middle East, Trump is likely to insist the United States also participate in any future regional fee arrangement.
To be workable, this will need to be in line with international law, with fees covering services such as pollution response, security, and navigation support.
Politically, it will also need to have regional backing and actively involve the littoral states of the strait.
International actors should encourage Tehran and Washington to accept third-party oversight of such a fund.
The IMO, which already administers a trust fund for the Strait of Malacca, would be well placed to perform this role.
Using a third-party entity would give a management system for the Strait of Hormuz greater credibility and durability.
Iran should also be open to such a structure because it would improve the chances of securing the U.S. sanctions exemptions needed for commercial operators to pay fees to Iran.
The longer the strait remains a point of contention, the more entrenched the two sides become—trapping Tehran and Trump in a continuing cycle of war.
It would be foolish for either side to abandon the MOU and continue the high-stakes fighting of recent days.
Neither appears likely to gain what a year of intermittent bombing has failed to achieve.
Ultimately, both sides will have to return to diplomacy, but only after wasting more resources and lives while potentially weakening the leverage they currently hold.
Analysis
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