The Transatlantic Alliance Can’t Survive Without Trust

Washington Dismisses NATO’s Value at Its Own Peril

U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte in Brussels, June 2026 Stoyan Nenov / Reuters

WOLFGANG ISCHINGER is Chairman of the Munich Security Conference. He previously served as State Secretary of the German Foreign Office and German Ambassador to the United States.

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Article link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/nato-transatlantic-alliance-cant-survive-without-trust https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/nato-transatlantic-alliance-cant-survive-without-trust

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This wariness of the United States has been building for months. In Ukraine, rather than clearly representing collective allied interests in the diplomatic process to end the war, Washington has presented itself as a mediator between Russia and NATO. This was most apparent in Trump’s 28-point peace plan, leaked in November 2025, that heavily favored Russian interests, causing consternation in European capitals. Meanwhile, his public threats to seize Greenland have been met with outright hostility. In January, when Washington threatened to impose tariffs on European countries that opposed Trump’s ambition to acquire the territory, the European Union started to consider retaliatory economic measures whose use against an ally would previously have been unthinkable. The Greenland episode generated ill will among the European public, too. A poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations and conducted in May 2026 in 15 European countries shows that a quarter of Europeans now view the United States as a rival or even an adversary—and the numbers are rising.

Trump has now challenged Europe’s sense of safety.

The consequences of this erosion of trust should be of immediate concern to Washington. One potential outcome is that Europeans might start looking for alternatives to the transatlantic partnership. Some countries might be tempted to hedge between China and the United States—as countries in Latin America and elsewhere are doing already—including by deepening economic ties with Beijing. Others might even choose to side with China. And if far-right parties gain power in certain European countries, their leaders have suggested they might seek to rekindle political, business, and energy ties with Moscow rather than Washington.

Perhaps more important, by allowing the crisis of trust to persist, the United States risks missing out on the benefits of an alliance with a truly capable partner. Europe has ceased to be a free rider and is quickly becoming a strategic asset. Its contributions are most obvious in Ukraine , where European countries have filled in the gaps as American assistance has declined. In 2025 alone, they increased their financial and humanitarian support by almost 60 percent and military assistance by 67 percent, spending more than $80 billion, according to the Germany-based Kiel Institute. Europe has financed the continued delivery of American weapons to Ukraine using a NATO procurement mechanism, and the EU has kept Ukraine from financial collapse by providing it with a loan package worth more than $100 billion. The United States’ allies, in effect, have enabled Washington to reduce its involvement in the war without severely jeopardizing Ukraine’s prospects—which is precisely what American officials have long wanted.

If Europe delivers on its defense spending pledges, becoming a capable military power in its own right, then the United States will have even more to gain from the alliance. With larger numbers of well-equipped soldiers at elevated states of readiness, Europe will be able to engage in high-intensity operations and sustained deployments. A stronger European defense industrial base would also provide additional capacity and useful redundancies for the U.S. defense industrial base, which is already struggling to replenish stockpiles after a few weeks of war against Iran.

But having a materially strong ally in Europe will do the United States little good if European leaders are not willing to work closely with Washington. Cooperation on stabilizing the Middle East and building a durable European security architecture depends on mutual trust—and requires that the United States treat Europe as a partner, not as a dependent.

Fortunately for American officials, Washington has an opportunity to win back Europe’s trust: the Ukraine negotiations. During the Balkan wars of the 1990s, the United States coordinated its diplomatic efforts through the Contact Group, which brought together France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom for regular meetings. A similar mechanism could bring key European allies into today’s U.S.-led talks. Europeans, after all, will be indispensable to securing a cease-fire, containing Russia, and ensuring long-term stability after the war ends. The unity on display at the G-7 summit in France in June—where leaders affirmed their “unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” pledged to deliver more aid, and committed to increasing economic pressure on Russia—indicates that there is a window of opportunity to work toward peace. But Washington now needs to ensure that Europe has a real stake in any deal that might emerge.

Europe has ceased to be a free rider and is quickly becoming a strategic asset.

The United States must also try to mend the rift it created when it began the war with Iran by bringing Europe into the talks to secure the peace. Europeans stand ready to support efforts to restore and maintain freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz; France and the United Kingdom have been advocating a multinational mission to do just that. They bring decades of experience from the negotiations that culminated in the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. And they can help Washington secure buy-in from key regional actors, including the Gulf states, for a final settlement with Tehran, lowering the risk of a return to war.

The United States may continue to reduce its military footprint in Europe, but it should carefully coordinate any drawdowns or changes. When American leaders announce troop withdrawals abruptly and as a punishment—such as when Trump announced in early May that thousands of U.S. soldiers would be withdrawn from Germany, after German Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the war in Iran—they reinforce the perception of an unbalanced relationship and further erode trust. Close consultation is necessary to allow European countries to replace any essential capabilities the United States withdraws. If the United States acts unilaterally, Russia will eagerly exploit the resulting gaps in NATO defenses, putting at risk not only European societies and armies but also U.S. soldiers stationed on the continent.

Finally, the United States must accept that Europe needs to reduce its dependence on the American defense industry. Washington seems reluctant to do so; in December, during the NATO foreign ministers meeting, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau reportedly told European allies that policies he considered to be protectionist and exclusionary, pushing U.S. companies out of the European market, would undermine collective defense. So far, Europe’s rearmament has relied heavily on purchases from American firms: European NATO members sourced roughly 51 percent of their military equipment from the United States between 2022 and 2024. But if Europe is to assume greater responsibility for its own defense, it needs to sustain public support for higher budgets. That requires spending more at home, so that investments in defense generate jobs and broader domestic economic returns. And if Europe’s spending is to yield more effective militaries, the continent will need a genuine single market for defense and cooperation on the procurement and development of weapons. A competitive European defense industrial base does not pose a threat to the United States. Instead, it will make NATO stronger by expanding the alliance’s industrial capacity.

A MATURE RELATIONSHIP

Europe may still look like a free rider to some in Washington. It can be slow to act, and its progress has been uneven. But it is clear that Europeans are increasingly prepared to invest in the defense of the continent. In the years ahead, Europe will want the United States to remain engaged in the continent’s security through its involvement in NATO and provision of its nuclear umbrella. It will also seek the ability to deter Russia conventionally on its own. Europe’s wishes are nothing extraordinary; Washington has long regarded its own freedom of action as indispensable to its security. Yet preserving a transatlantic relationship in which both sides can choose when to act independently and when to act in concert requires trust between allies.

The NATO summit this month is an opportunity to take the first steps toward rebuilding that kind of relationship. Europeans should present a clear and sustainable path to meeting their defense spending pledges and express their willingness and ability to shoulder a larger share of Europe’s conventional deterrence and defense. The United States, in turn, should reaffirm its commitment to the alliance. In practice, that means discussing the details of how to shift defense responsibilities with allies, working out a transition plan with agreed timelines for potential troop or capability withdrawals, and involving Europeans in negotiations to end the wars in Ukraine. Washington should treat NATO’s decision-making body as the go-to forum for coordination and consultation on security concerns that alliance members share.

For decades, Washington complained that Europe was not doing enough. Now that Europe is finally doing more, the question is whether American leaders recognize the opportunity in front of them. If the United States is ready to treat Europe as a genuine partner, it will gain not only a stronger ally but also a more sustainable foundation for its own global leadership.

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