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How Ukraine Figured Out Trump World

Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba on the White House’s seeming change in tone toward Kyiv.

By Ravi Agrawal , the editor in chief of Foreign Policy .

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July 10, 2026, 1:48 PM

We’ve come a long way from the Oval Office meeting last year when U.S. President Donald Trump told Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky “you don’t have the cards.” Kyiv seems to have come up with some aces recently, with regular drone attacks deep into Russian territory. Amid the Iran conflict, the United States and its allies have turned to Ukraine to learn how it built an ecosystem of cheap offensive drones. And at the NATO summit in Turkey earlier this week, Trump agreed to give Kyiv a license to manufacture Patriot missile interceptors, potentially mitigating a key Ukrainian vulnerability in the future.

Nothing succeeds like success. But has Kyiv simultaneously figured out how to navigate Trump? The strategy is “to placate, make offers, accept what Trump offers to you,” says Dmytro Kuleba, who served as Ukraine’s foreign minister during the first two years of the war. But Kyiv must do this “while quietly continuing the strategy of decoupling” from Washington, he adds.

I spoke with Kuleba on the latest episode of FP Live about Ukraine’s broader strategy, the chances for peace talks, and what role Europe and the United States might play. Kuleba is now a senior fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School. You can watch our full discussion in the video box atop this page, or by downloading the FP Live podcast. What follows here is a lightly edited and condensed transcript.

Ravi Agrawal: Let’s start with one item of news coming out of the NATO summit . [U.S. President Donald] Trump announced that Ukraine will be able to produce Patriot interceptor missiles. He’s going to give them a license to do so. How significant is this move?

Dmytro Kuleba: It’s big, but I would like to start by reminding you that the first time Ukraine requested the license to produce Patriot missiles in Ukraine was December 2023. This is just another story of how long it takes the West to make the most obvious decisions. This war is becoming more and more aerial , and there will never be enough Patriots to intercept all the ballistic missiles. So we welcome the decision, but we have to be conscious that it will take months, if not years, to actually put the production in place.

RA: I was just going to ask you about that, because Germany and Japan also have this license, and it’s been very difficult for them to actually manufacture these interceptors, and they’re several years in.

DK: Yeah. This is at least a midterm solution to a problem that needs to be solved today. We welcome the announcement. We understand that it will take years to put the manufacturing in place. There’s another issue: how to sustain the supply of all the components for the production. And the problem is that this solution does not solve the tragedy of Ukrainians living under a barrage of Russian ballistic missiles pouring on their heads literally every week. This is the problem that needs to be addressed now while the problem for the future seems to be in the process of being resolved.

RA: While we’re discussing the NATO summit, other than the Patriot issue, how do you feel Ukraine has emerged from the summit?

DK: Given the fact that the issue of accession to NATO is not being debated anymore, I think Ukraine emerged largely as a winner. There was strong demand for Ukraine at the NATO Defense Industry Forum. The political messaging from President Trump and other NATO leaders was also positive. I think the lesson here is that if you put the accession aside, Ukraine looks much stronger in its relations with NATO. When you debate enlargement, things get messy.

RA: Do you agree that Trump’s tone has shifted a fair bit in the last 18 months or so? We all remember that infamous meeting in the Oval Office where he said “You don’t have the cards right now,” and now, he seems decidedly more optimistic about Ukraine’s future. If you agree with that assessment, where do you think that’s coming from? What is changing for Trump when it comes to this war?

DK: I believe the biggest challenge in handling President Trump is not to make him change his position but to sustain his position that favors your interests. It’s good that he is positive these days, and I agree with you that he probably was advised that Ukraine is winning the war now and he should change the tone, although it’s a big question whether we are already winning the war.

But the issue is, even if he is positive now, how do you sustain this attitude? How do you avoid a rupture or a dramatic U-turn the next day, which Russia will certainly be working on? So this is the question that still has no answer.

RA: Let me push you to at least try to answer it. What is the strategy that Ukraine must approach around Trump?

DK: Well, you know, don’t touch it if it works. If the strategy that [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky, together with several other leaders, have adopted toward Trump since last summer has been largely working, you cannot avoid all of the risks and eruptions, but you can manage it.

RA: And what is that strategy?

DK: That strategy is to placate, make offers, accept what Trump offers to you, if he doesn’t cross your red lines, while quietly continuing the strategy of decoupling.

RA: Say a bit more about that last bit. Decoupling from needing the United States longer term?

DK: Yes. Let me bring up the easiest example. For three years, Ukraine critically depended on the supply of long-range capabilities from the United States and its European partners. Every supply was either limited or restricted in the conditions of how these drones or missiles could be used. While continuing these fights with friends for the deliveries, Ukraine heavily invested itself in the development of its own capabilities . You do not hear fights over German Taurus or American ATACMS anymore—not because Ukraine doesn’t want them, but because Ukraine developed its own capability. Now we strike deep in Russia, like 2,000 kilometers [1,240 miles] deep.

This is what quiet decoupling means: Have the relationship, get what you can, but keep building your own capabilities. Because if you have them, then your agency gets much stronger. And today, you hear American interest in Ukrainian air defense technologies and Ukrainian drones, which was something unimaginable even two years ago.

RA: Nothing succeeds like success.

You were just in Kyiv. Can you talk a little bit about the mood there? There was recently a barrage of missiles that Kyiv was unable to stop. Talk a bit about what things are like.

DK: I live in Kyiv, and I can describe the dynamics of the war through my own experience. Two weeks ago, I was in the basement of my house during the missile and drone attack on Kyiv. Over the years, I’ve learned the difference in how a hit sounds and how the air defense firing sounds. Two weeks ago, I counted four air defense interceptors being fired to intercept Russian ballistic missiles. A week ago, during the same attack, I heard zero interceptors being fired. The next morning, our air defenses published an official statement that we were not able to intercept any single ballistic missile because we didn’t have Patriot interceptors to do that.

So this is the mood in Kyiv. We all know now that we are within shooting range for Russia. They have plenty of missiles; we have zero interceptors. We are very good at intercepting drones, and we are good at intercepting cruise missiles. But the Russians know our vulnerabilities, and they shower us with ballistic missiles.

So the mood is bad. Of course, when you read the news from the front line and from Russia, it kind of cheers you up. But you understand at the same time that there is no shield that can protect you from being killed. That balances people’s attitudes.

RA: I can imagine. As you look at the last few months of conflict in Iran, a range of countries have used many different types of missile interceptors, including Patriot interceptors. By some reporting, the United States has extinguished about a third of its own supply of Patriot interceptors. When you look at the war as it was and as it may yet be amid reports that the MOU [memorandum of understanding] might be over , according to Trump, and there is some more conflict breaking out, how much has the war on Iran hurt Ukraine’s effort to win its war on Russia?

DK: The biggest loss is exactly the one that you are referring to: It’s the interceptors. We have to understand that in 2026 and beyond, the war will be decided in the air, not on the ground. That phase is over. So whoever is better equipped for a war in the air will get an upper hand. We are in the air race now. And when in the middle of that race, your potential to defend yourself gets knocked out, nothing worse could happen to you.

There is a silver lining to the war in Iran, like a new dynamic in the relationships between Ukraine and the Gulf countries, because they are now eager to learn and buy from Ukraine to strengthen their air defenses, [and] a new level of interest, as weird as it may sound, coming from the U.S. military in Ukrainian solutions. This is the silver lining.

But again, the war had a negative impact on Ukraine’s defensive capabilities because of the vast use of Patriot interceptors by America. And now you don’t even have to make a bad political decision that everyone will criticize you for, to not supply Ukraine with interceptors, because it will suffice to say that “we just don’t have them anymore.”

RA: And of course, it takes years to manufacture them. Now, I want to juxtapose all of this we’re talking about—a grim mood on the ground in Kyiv, this clear sense that there are just fewer interceptors to buy on the market, countries want to hold on to the supplies they do have—and yet, over the last few months, headlines about the war have proclaimed that Ukraine is turning the tables, that it’s put Russia on the back foot, and even that it’s winning, all of this strong language. Do you agree with it? What is the basis for it?

DK: I believe that a fair and accurate way to describe the reality of the war would be to say that Ukraine has stabilized the pressure Russia puts on it and has found the way to increase the pressure it puts on Russia .

But I would really not describe this as a turning point. I think people are making an intellectual analysis mistake here. I don’t want to sound offensive. Turning points are always defined retrospectively. No one in January or February of 1943 believed seriously that the way the Battle of Stalingrad ended was a turning point in the Second World War in Europe, right? You can only define this as time passes, and we’re just not there yet. We are living through it.

Secondly, war is a race. Yes, Ukraine should be finding solutions that it had worked on for two years. But Russia is looking for its own solutions now, and they will find them to counter Ukrainian advances in technology and tactics. The situation for Ukraine in the war overall has improved. It’s premature to call it a turning point. To maintain this upper hand in the war, Ukraine has to continue addressing the problems that hold it back and come up with new technological solutions to be ahead of Russia in the art of war.

RA: Talk a bit about the drones and the impact they’ve had on this war. Because on the one hand, it’s so clear that Ukraine has deployed them to great effect and has used them to take the war to Russia. But I’m also aware that drone technology can be obsolete very quickly. And so, this is a race in which Russia could catch up fairly quickly or could have new innovations that could nullify the ones that Ukraine currently has.

What is that like from Kyiv’s perspective, to try to keep innovating on that front?

DK: First, I have to say that I think people are following a wrong development. Instead of being obsessed with Ukrainian drones, which is a good thing for Ukraine of course, I really believe that people should be focused on answering the question: How did Ukraine manage to build the whole industry from scratch in just three years?

The industry of drone production did not exist three years ago. I speak with foreign diplomats and defense companies, and they all come to Ukraine to speak to a drone company, to partner with them, or to buy something from them. What is missing here is people don’t understand that to get an industry, you need to create an ecosystem first. Drones are the outcome of the defense industry ecosystem that Ukraine brilliantly built in just three years.

Our friends in Europe are missing that point. They are focused on partnering with companies from Ukraine or testing their products instead of building an ecosystem for their own defense industry to flourish, with Ukraine’s defense industry as an integral part of an overall European one.

The second problem is that everyone who comes to Ukraine is looking at solutions that work, which makes sense because it’s a business instinct to buy what already works on the battlefield. But as you alluded to, this is where the problem comes, because they don’t understand that this product will be outdated within a week. You have to find the time and resources to look for the solutions of tomorrow, not only of today. There are brilliant Ukrainian companies who develop or are in the final stage of developing products which will define the way war will look tomorrow. These companies largely still operate and develop their products in isolation. Everyone wants to buy what works, and it’s good for Ukraine, but the buyers don’t understand that what they’re buying today will become obsolete tomorrow.

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RA: So, you were Ukraine’s top diplomat for several years. Let’s talk a little bit about diplomacy. President Zelensky has approved a campaign of 40 days to bring [Russian President] Vladimir Putin to the negotiating table. What do you make of that plan, and what is your sense of whether any sort of peace deal negotiation could work out?

DK: First, Zelensky, President Zelensky is brilliant in putting together a framework that allows us to describe reality and the effort that is being made. People understand what is going on, what we are doing, what is the purpose. He’s a great communicator, and this 40-day plan is just another plan that he put in place.

But I’m afraid the plan will have to be extended once the 40 days are over. I don’t think Putin is going to collapse within 40 days. I think Putin is living through his Joseph Stalin moment. And if he actually talks to anyone, I think it’s him. Stalin’s moment is when everything is falling apart around you, you do not give in . You tighten the screws. You double down on your effort, sending the message, “Nothing can break me.”

Putin is waiting for the winter to come because he believes that will be a good time to crush Ukraine, its energy system, and the resilience of its people. Then Putin will be waiting for elections in France in the hope that the change of power will destroy the European support for Ukraine in this war. Putin is always waiting. Waiting for a change that will favor him.

And therefore, I do not expect, speaking now on July 9, I do not see where a cease-fire may come from. But we live in a world of very high uncertainty, so perhaps something is going to change, like a black swan will land and things will change. But as of now, I think we will spend the rest of 2026 in a war, in a state of very active fighting, primarily in the air.

RA: That thing you just said about elections in France, which Marine Le Pen now has been allowed to run in, and there are elections in other countries coming up across Europe, many of us are expecting the far right to make advances in some of those countries. There’s also some reporting that some European leaders, such as Finnish President Alexander Stubb, are now saying that they’re willing to sit down with Putin to talk to him.

What do you make of all of that? Is it worth sitting down and talking to him, or is he just going to kick the can down the road and wait?

DK: I think European leaders should come to terms with one simple reality: Putin does not recognize them as equals. Putin wants to negotiate with Trump, with the United States of America. If you followed the Russian propaganda and official narratives for the last 20 years, you could easily come to the conclusion that Putin despises Europe only slightly less than he despises Ukraine. For him, this is not an equal partner. For him, he will use having a guest from Europe just to show the weakness of Europeans and his own strengths. There will always be someone in Europe who will be willing to offer his good offices as a negotiator with Russia. [French] President [Emmanuel] Macron tried for a while. You haven’t heard him saying that recently. Now there are other people who say they are ready to talk. I think they will lose everything and gain nothing from that conversation. But if they want to live through that experience, we should respect them and their wishes.

RA: What is your theory for how this war ends? If it’s not a negotiated deal, what is the thing that changes the status quo?

DK: It’s a war of wills. And the thing that will change the status quo will be the broken will. And the will can be broken either from the inside or from the outside. I don’t believe that this war will end in a negotiated settlement where every side will get something and we’ll leave the table unhappy, but the price of that unhappiness will be the end of hostilities. I think this war will end with the collapse of one of the parties to it: Either Russia will cease to exist as an imperial project, or Ukraine will cease to exist as an independent, sovereign, and European project.

Don’t get me wrong, I do not necessarily imply that the losing side will vanish from the map. It may stay, keep the flag, the anthem. But as political projects, these two entities—Ukraine and Russia, in their current forms—are incompatible. They cannot coexist. Both sides believe firmly that the loss in this war will mean the end for them.

This is the main driving force behind the conflict. How to break the will? That’s another question, but no interview will be enough to answer that.

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Ravi Agrawal is the editor in chief of Foreign Policy . X: @RaviReports

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